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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1. General Background  
Councillors are elected to represent local communities in the municipal council and to 
provide sound and accountable leadership to their respective communities during their 
tenure as public servants. They bridge the gap between the community and the 
municipality. A municipal council “makes decisions concerning the exercise of all the 
powers and the performance of all the functions of the municipality”.1 Furthermore, “the 
executive and legislative authority of the municipality is vested in the municipal 
council”.2 This makes the municipal council not only the highest decision-making body 
of the municipality but also the most important institution within a municipality.  
 
Needless to say that the efficiency of a municipal council is dependent on the 
performance of councillors within the municipality. Councillors play an important role in 
the decision-making processes of the municipality, both in council meetings or sessions 
and in the different committees of the council. All matters and questions before the 
council are decided by the majority of votes cast on a particular motion or issue.3 This 
means that the majority of councillors present in a council meeting must vote in favour 
of such motion before a decision can be adopted. The law is, however, silent on the 
decision-making procedure or norms applicable to committees of the municipal council. 
Some municipalities have adopted rules of orders that provide for the procedure 
according to which their committees should make decisions and pass resolutions. Many 
other municipalities have not done so. In practice, however, the procedure for decision-
making in committees of council is similar to that of the council.   
                                            
1 Section 160(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (“Constitution”). 
2 Section 151(2) of the Constitution. 
3 Section 30(3) of the Municipal structures Act 117 of 1998. 
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Municipal councillors in South Africa are usually deployed by political parties. It goes 
without saying that the political position or affiliation of councillors has a huge influence 
on the kind of decisions and resolutions councillors adopt. Often, councillors make 
decisions along party lines4. Sometimes their decisions are informed by personal 
interests that do not necessarily benefit the municipality or advance the best interest of 
the municipality. It is not uncommon that these decisions, either motivated by party 
discipline or personal interest, may also fall outside the bounds of law applicable to 
municipalities. This happens when councillors take decisions or adopt resolutions in 
blatant disregard of the rules applicable to decision-making in the municipal council. In 
other cases, decisions with major financial consequences on the municipality are taken 
without any professional advice whatsoever. In many instances, illegal decisions or 
resolutions are even adopted despite sound advice to the contrary. Councillors adopt 
unlawful decisions deliberately with full knowledge of their unlawfulness. Recent 
caselaw, which will be discussed later in this study, indicates that councillors use the 
“majority vote” rule of the council as a tool to adopt and support unlawful decisions. 
 
The increasing number of court cases dealing with applications to reverse council 
decisions on the basis of illegality indicates that these unlawful decisions eventually 
become a problem of the municipality and not just of those who made them. Recently, 
there have been quite a number of cases where a councillor or a party affected by an 
unlawful decision or resolution of the council has brought such unlawful decision to the 
attention of the courts, resulting in protracted and expensive legal disputes regarding 
the lawfulness of the decision taken by the municipal council. This situation 
subsequently affects the municipality negatively because when matters reach the court, 
it is the municipality that will, at least, incur expenses by way of paying costs of suit if 
the decision made by the council is set-aside on the basis of unlawfulness. Such costs 
are the fees charged by lawyers during protracted legal disputes and punitive costs 
orders should the decision be found to be unlawful. 
                                            
4 By making reference to 'party lines' I mean that the councillor is mandated by the political party (that 
deployed him or her) to exercise his vote in a particular manner.  
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1.2. Statement of the problem 
The issue of illegal decisions begs the question of whether or not councillors can be 
held individually liable for the unlawful decisions they make in their meetings, be it in 
council or committees of council. As such, the question that this study seeks to answer 
is, how and to what extent can councillors be held individually liable for these unlawful 
decisions. This study is about the individual liability of councillors in South Africa. It 
examines and analyses whether individual liability of councillors can serve as a bulwark 
against the abuse of decision-making power that is vested in the municipal council.           
 
The idea of holding councillors individually liable is not without controversy. Some claim 
that individual councillors can be held liable under common law liability for legal costs 
occasioned by their opposition to legal proceedings involving unlawful decisions. This 
applies when the unlawful decision taken by the council results in a court dispute. In 
terms of common law, councillors who vote in favour of unlawful decisions are 
individually and collectively liable for the cost occasioned by their opposition to legal 
action against the lawfulness of those decisions. Section 176 of the Local Government: 
Municipal Finance Management Act5 also provide for liability of councillors under certain 
circumstances. On the other hand, councillors, when propelled to answer for unlawful 
decisions, argue that they are protected by section 28 of the Local Government: 
Municipal Structures Act, 117 of 1998 (herein after referred to as the "Municipal 
Structures Act"). Section 28 of the Structures Act provides for privileges and immunities 
of councillors from civil or criminal liability for any decision they have made in council or 
its committees.6 
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the grey area surrounding the individual liability of 
councillors warrants the need to define the scope and ambit of section 28 of the 
Structures Act in order to ascertain the circumstances under which it protects 
                                            
5 Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003. The relevant provisions of this Act 
will be discussed later in the paper.  
6 Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. 
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councillors from individual liability. It also warrants the need to define the circumstances 
in terms of which common law individual liability would apply to councillors. 
Furthermore, the circumstances under which section 176 of the Municipal Finance 
Management Act7 is applicable to individual councilors also needs clarification.                     
 
1.3. Significance of the study 
The notion of individual liability is arguably one of the key measures of ensuring that 
bad political decision-making in local government does not defeat the object of good 
governance, which includes taking proper decisions and adopting sound resolutions at 
council level. This paper seeks to clarify the applicability of section 28 of the Municipal 
Structures Act to municipal councillors. This paper seeks to contribute to the 
government’s fight against abuse of power in local government and to strengthen the 
integrity of this young but very important sphere of government by determining the 
conditions and circumstances under which individual councillors can be held liable for 
unlawful decisions they adopt.  
 
1.4. Research methodology  
The research is mainly based on desktop review of the relevant legislative framework 
dealing with individual liability. Case law, articles and books will also be used in the 
course of this research. The study will also explore how other jurisdictions deal with the 
issue of liability and immunity of councillors.     
 
1.5. Literature review 
Few scholars have written on the individual liability of councillors in South Africa.  
Steytler and De Visser suggest that councillors should some howbe held individually 
liable for deliberately taking unlawful decisions, especially if advice to the contrary has 
been given to those councillors but was ignored.8 De Visser further argues that 
councillors’ immunity should not be used as a license to support illegal decisions that 
                                            
7 Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003. 
8 Steytler N and De Visser  J Local Government of South Africa (2009) 3-18. 
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are made deliberately.9 Other than the contributions made by Steytler and De Visser, 
not much has been written on the topic in the South Africa context. As a result, there is 
still a lack of clarity on how, to what extent and under what circumstances individual 
councilors can be held liable. The notion of holding councillors liable or responsible for 
abuse of power in the context of voting obviously requires extensive academic 
discussion.   
 
1.6. The structure of the study 
This study will be divided into 4 chapters. Chapter two provides an overview of local 
government in South Africa and pays particular attention to the role and function of 
councillors in local government. It will also examine and attempt to define the concept of 
individual liability of councilors. This chapter further analyses the provisions of section 
176(2) of the Municipal Finance Management Act, focusing on the manner in which the 
section responds to the question of individual liability of councillors. This section is one 
of the few legislative provisions that expressly deal with individual liability of councillors 
in certain circumstances. This Chapter also focuses on the recent developments 
relating to individual liability of councillors in terms of the Systems Amendment Act.10 It 
seeks to examine whether this Act adequately addresses the problem of abuse of 
decision-making power.  
 
Chapter three discusses the nature and extent of privileges and immunities afforded to 
councillors by section 28 of the Structures Act.  It highlights the effect that this section 
has on the notion of individual liability of councillors. This chapter is, to a large extent, 
based on case law that shed light on the interpretation of section 28 of the Structures 
Act. 
 
Chapter four concludes the study by evaluating the individual liability of councillors in 
light of the analysis forwarded in the preceding chapters. 
 
                                            
9 De Visser J 'Individual liability' (2008) 10(4) Local Government Bulletin 27. 
10 Local Government: Systems Amendment Act 7 of 2011. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Individual liability of councillors 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The study, as indicated in the preceding chapter, aims at examining the individual 
liability of councillors in local government. In order to carry out such an examination, it is 
important to first explain and discuss the role and place of the municipal council and 
councillors in local government. With that in mind, the chapter will first discuss the pre-
constitutional period of local government before proceeding to discuss the position of 
local government under the current constitutional dispensation. This chapter will also 
discuss the meaning of individual liability of councillors. It further analyses the individual 
liability of councillors with reference to the provisions of the Local Government: 
Municipal Finance Management Act ("MFMA").11 This Act, which was enacted in terms 
of section 164 of the Constitution, deals with the financial management of local 
government. Of particular relevance to the question of liability of councillors is section 
176 of the MFMA, which provides for liability of functionaries exercising powers and 
functions in terms of the MFMA.  
 
Furthermore, the study will determine the scope of application of section 176 of the 
MFMA. It will discuss the functionaries to which the section applies with the aim of 
establishing whether or not, ordinary individual councillors are included in those 
functionaries. The chapter will also analyse the recent legislative developments that are 
intended to minimise abuse of power in local government. It will particularly focus on the 
Local Government: Systems Amendment Act.12 
 
                                            
11 Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003. 
12 Local Government: Systems Amendment Act, 7 of 2011.  
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2.2 The legal status of local government  
2.2.1 The pre-constitutional period 
South Africa’s experience with local government dates back to1910 with the formation 
of the Union of South Africa, which transformed four British colonies into provinces.13 
Each province enacted legislation that provided for the structures, functions, and 
powers of local governments in the province. Local government was, in the words of De 
Visser, ‘subservient, racist and consequently illegitimate’.14 Local government was racist 
in that local authorities were established according to racial lines. Affluent municipalities 
were located in white areas and these municipalities had a good revenue base and 
could impose rates and taxes. They further did not bear the financial burden of servicing 
disadvantaged black areas.15 The apartheid government intensified institutional 
segregation by providing for the development of separate local authorities for each 
racial group (Blacks, Colored, Indians and Whites).16 Local government was introduced 
as a responsibility of the provinces. Local government was subservient in that it required 
permission and approval from national and provincial government when it came to the 
exercise of its powers and functions. Furthermore, the local authorities existed in terms 
of provincial laws and their powers were dependent on, and curtailed by, these 
provincial laws. It, therefore, follows that because local government was very 
‘subservient’, its council was not autonomous and was arguably not the highest 
decision-making body on local government matters. The subservient nature of local 
authorities continued to exist until the 1990’s when the Interim Constitution of South 
Africa, Act 200 of 1993(the "Interim Constitution") was promulgated.   
 
During the pre-constitutional stage of local government, it seems that the individual 
liability of councilors was arguably never an issue. This is because the council’s 
decision-making powers were curtailed and subjected to the approval of provincial 
                                            
13 De Visser J  'Republic of South Africa' in Steytler et al, Local government and metropolitan regions in 
federal systems(2009) 270. 
14 De Visser J (2009) 271. 
15 See De Visser J (2009) 270 – 271. 
16 De Visser J (2009) 271. 
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administrators. Since local government was very fragmented and segregated according 
to race, not all municipalities or local authorities had fully fledged councils or political 
municipal councils. Only White Local Authorities ("WLAs") had fully-fledged councils.17 
Management Boards and Local Affairs Committees technically governed Coloured and 
Indian areas. Both institutions relied on the administration of WLAs and/or provincial 
administration to provide services on its behalf. Typically, these Management 
Committees were established through elections, characterized by very low levels of 
voter participation and generally regarded as illegitimate.18 African communities fell 
under the jurisdiction of Black Local Authority ("BLAs"). According to Nyalunga, these 
were beleaguered structures from their inception due to militant opposition from the 
black community and had a well-established reputation for inefficiency, graft and 
collaboration with white interests.19 The leaders of BLAs were seemingly used as 
agents to administer local government activities.20 It follows from this that there isa 
possibility that many local authorities in other areas during the pre-constitution stage did 
not have councillors but had administrative staff. 
 
What is not clear was the approach that was followed in dealing with illegal decisions 
adopted and supported by councillors in council meetings.21 It is not clear whether it was 
the function of the provincial and national government to oversee decisions taken by 
councillors as local government which, at the time, was a creature of provincial 
ordinances and national legislation. Most court cases during the pre-constitutional 
period of local government were against the municipalities and not the individual 
councillors. These cases dealt with the delictual claims against municipalities for 
negligence and breach of the general legal duty of care.22It is not clear if municipalities 
                                            
17 Nyalunga D 'The Revitilisation of Local Government in South Africa' (2006) 1(2) International NGO 
Journal, 2. Also available online at <www.academicjournals.org> [accessed on 15 May 2011]. 
18 Cameron RThe Democratisation of South African local government: A tale of three cities (1999)7.  
19 Nyalunga D (2006) 2. 
20 De Visser J (2009) 271. 
21 This of course relates to municipalities that actually had fully-fledged municipal councils. 
22 Butters v City of Cape Town Municipality 1993 (3) SA 521 (C).  In this particular case, the plaintiff 
claimed damages from the from the defendant in respect of bodily injuries which the plaintiff sustained in 
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were ever confronted with cases where councillors adopted unlawful decisions in 
council.                    
 
2.2.2. Constitutional period 
The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993, ushered-in 
constitutional recognition for local government by acknowledging its autonomy and 
guaranteeing its revenue-generating powers as well as a right to a share in the 
nationally generated revenue.23  It was clear at this stage that local government would 
be allowed to stand on its own and make its own mistakes as a sphere of government in 
the new South Africa. Local government was recognized in the Interim Constitution and 
its status was improved.  The new status of local government was well articulated in 
Fedsure Life Assurance v Greater Johannesburg.24In that case Kriegler J remarked: 
The constitutional status of local government is thus materially different to what it was 
when parliament was supreme when not only the powers but the very existence of local 
government depended entirely on superior legislatures. The institution of elected local 
government could then have been terminated at any time and its functions entrusted to 
administrators appointed by the central or provincial governments. That no longer is the 
position. Local governments have a place in the constitutional order, have to be 
established by the competent authority, and are entitled to certain powers, including the 
power to make by-laws and impose rates.25 
 
                                                                                                                                             
1990 when he fell into the Liesbeeck River canal and the public parking area at Rondebosch, and this 
canal was situated in the respondent property of which the respondent was the owner.  The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant municipality was negligent in not having provided a suitable barrier between 
the parking area and the canal.  There may be other cases that dealt with claims for negligence on the 
side of municipalities such as the City of Cape Town Municipality v Paine 1923 AD 207 and Moulang v 
Port Elizabeth Municipality 1958 (2) SA 518 (A).    
23 De Visser J (2009) 272. 
24 Fedsure life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and 
Others (1999) (1) SA 374 (CC).  
25 Fedsure life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and 
Others (1999) (1) SA 374 (CC). 38. 
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This judgment reaffirmed the provisions of the Interim Constitution that posit local 
government as a fully-fledged sphere of government in the new multi-sphere 
government of South Africa.   
 
Building on the constitutional recognition of local government in the interim Constitution, 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 (the "Constitution"), 
firmly established local government’s autonomy. The drafters of the Final Constitution 
dedicated a full chapter on local government, establishing it as a sphere of 
government.26  By way of enhancing the autonomy of local government, the Constitution 
stipulates that “a municipality has a right to govern, on its own initiative, the local 
government affairs of its community”.27  It further states that “the national and provincial 
government may not compromise or impede a municipality’s ability or right to exercise 
its powers or perform its function”.28 From these provisions, it is clear that local 
government is no longer a responsibility of provincial government. It has a right to 
govern its community affairs and the exercise of such powers should not be interfered 
with by the other spheres of government. 
 
Local government, as a sphere of government that is closest to the people, must use its 
autonomy purposively to provide services and promote development.29 The mandate of 
local government is contained in section 152 of the Constitution.  According to section 
152, the objects of local government include the provision of democratic and 
accountable government for local communities,30 the provision of services to 
communities in a sustainable manner, the promotion of social and economic 
development, and a safe and healthy environment.  Municipalities are instructed to 
strive to achieve these objects using their financial and administrative capacity.31 
                                            
26 Chapter 7 of the Constitution. 
27 Section 151(3) of the Constitution. 
28 Section 151(4) of the Constitution.  
29 Steytler N and De Visser J (2009) 27. 
30 This object is reiterated in section 4(2)(b) of the Systems Act which provides that the council has duty to 
provide without favour or prejudice, democratic and accountable government.        
31 Section 152(2) of the Constitution. 
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From the foregoing, it is clear that the mandate of local government is 'development-
centered'. This mandate is further elaborated in section 153 of the Constitution, which 
creates a duty on a municipality to “structure and manage its administration and 
budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, 
and promote the social and economic development of the community”.32 Municipalities 
have the duty to comply with the developmental duties enshrined in the Constitution.         
 
2.3. The role and function of councillors in local government. 
Councillors play an important role in ensuring their local government effectively 
implements its development mandate. This study does not wish to provide an 
exhaustive list of the roles and functions of councillors. It simply highlights the major 
activities of councillors in local government. Before we discuss the role and function of 
councillors, it is, however, important to briefly introduce the municipal council, focusing 
on its structure as well as the role and function it is expected to perform.   
 
2.3.1. The role and function of the Municipal Council 
A municipality consists of political structures, administration and the community of the 
municipality.33 Political structures of the municipality include the municipal council. In the 
following paragraphs, we will discuss the municipal council in order to determine its 
importance to local governance. 
 
A municipal council is composed of councilors,34 who are democratically elected by 
registered voters within the jurisdiction of a municipality.35 As a political structure within 
a municipality,36 it is vested with the legislative and executive authority of the 
                                            
32 Section 153(a) of the Constitution. 
33 Section 2(b) of the Municipal Systems Act. 
34 These councillors are either representing a political party or elected as independent members. 
However, the latter manner of representation is very seldom. 
35 SALGA 'Handbook for Municipal Councillor' (2006) 12. Available at 
<www.adac.co.za/articles/councillors - handbook> [accessed on 1 Jun 2010].  
36 Municipal Systems Act section 1. 
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municipality. As indicated in chapter one, this structure is responsible for all decisions of 
the municipality unless it has delegated a specific power to a committee or another 
body.37Generally speaking, the role of the council includes making policies and by-laws 
through its legislative authority, monitoring implementation of those policies and 
intervening or taking corrective actions where necessary.38 The function of the council 
may be defined as representation, providing leadership to its constituency in the 
municipal area, participating in decision-making and exercising delegated and statutory 
powers.39 
 
The council exercises oversight over the municipal executive. The nature of the 
oversight depends on the particular executive system that a council has established. In 
this regard, there are two executive systems that are applicable in local government, 
namely the collective executive system and the executive mayor system. If the 
municipality has a collective executive system, its committee is accountable to the 
council at all times.  On the other hand, if the municipality has an executive mayor 
system, it is the executive mayor that is directly accountable to the council and not the 
mayoral committee.   
 
One of the contentious issues regarding the power of council to exercise oversight over 
the executive relates to the fact that the council has the power to subsequently remove 
the office bearers in these bodies if it is not satisfied with their work or for any other 
reason. This can be done by resolution adopted in a council meeting.40  Steyter and De 
Visser41 submit that the council’s prerogative to appoint and fire its committees was 
                                            
37 However, the delegation itself does not divest the council of its responsibilities of making decisions in 
the municipality. The council has the ability to revisit any decisions taken in terms of delegated authority 
or revisit the delegation of authority itself for further discussion on this see, Steytler N  De Visser J'Local 
government' in Woolman, S et al Constitutional law of South Africa2 ed(2008) 22-37. 
38 SALGA (2006) 47. 
39 SALGA (2006) 47. 
40 Section 53 of the Municipal Structures Act. 
41 Steytler N and De Visser J (2009) 3-31. 
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clarified in Marais v Democratic Alliance.42In that case the Democratic Alliance told its 
mayor that it has lost confidence in his ability to function as mayor and urged the mayor 
to subsequently resign from his position. The court emphasized that Marais was a duly 
elected municipal official and only the municipal council has the power to remove him 
from office.43 
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the council is the highest decision-making body of the 
municipality and the rules applicable to this body regarding decision-making should be 
respected and applied at all times by those serving in this structure. This shows the 
crucial role that councillors play in ensuring that the powers and functions of the 
municipal council are used to advance the interests of the community. What are then 
the role and function of councillors in local government? 
 
2.3.2. The role of councillors 
Councillors are elected to represent local communities and the interests of their 
respective political parties in the municipal council. They exercise all the powers and 
functions of the municipal council mentioned above. It goes without saying that 
councillors, as members of the council, have to work together in implementing and 
exercising the functions and powers of the council. Councillors are a link between the 
community and the council and are expected to be in close contact with their 
constituencies ‘on the ground’ and to keep the council informed of the real experiences 
and views of the residents within the municipality.44 This process contributes to the 
enhancement of participatory democracy in the municipality as citizens have the right 
not only to elect their representatives but to participate actively in government decision-
making on a continuous basis.   
 
To begin with, councillors serve in committees of the council. The committees of council 
are made up of a group of councillors who are usually designated to review or develop 
                                            
42 Marais v Democratic Alliance [2002] JOL 9241 (C).  
43 Marais v Democratic Alliance [2002] JOL 9241 (C) para 54.  
44 SALGA (2006) 49. 
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new policies relating to a specific issue. The executive committee is one committee that 
has a lot of influence in the manner in which the council leads the community or its 
constituency. This committee,45 among other things, assists the municipality in 
identifying and prioritising the needs of the municipality,46 recommends strategies, 
programmes and services to the council in order to address those needs through the 
Integrated Development Plan..,47 and oversees the provision of services in a 
sustainable manner.48 This is why this committee has to be established in terms of the 
Structures Act and the Constitution.49 Because of the importance of this committee, the 
Structures Act provides that the executive committee must be composed in such a way 
that parties and interests represented in the municipal council are represented in the 
executive committee in the same proportion that they are represented in the council.50 
What is important to note about this committee is that is made up of councillors and 
these councillors bear the responsibility of implementing strategic programmes of the 
municipality.  
 
The other committees of council are section 79 and 80 committees, which are designed 
to assist the council to perform its functions effectively and efficiently.51 Section 79 
committees are often configured as appeal committees and rules and disciplinary 
committees.52 Section 80 committees are also appointed by the council but their 
chairpersons are appointed by executive committee or executive mayor if municipality 
uses the executive mayor system. Section 80 committees are linked to specific 
                                            
45 It is submitted that the executive committee is the “principal committee” of the council, and the 
executive committee receives reports from other committees of council and forwards these reports with 
recommendation to the full council, see section 44(1)(a). 
46 Section 44(2)(a) of the structures Act. 
47 Section 44(2)(c) of the Structures Act. 
48 Section 44(3)(e) of the Structures Act. 
49 See section 160(8) of the Constitution. 
50 Section 43(1) and (2) of the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. 
51 These committees are in Section 79 and 80 of the Municipal Structures Act.117 of 1998. 
52 Steytler N & De Visser J (2011) 3-42.  
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portfolios with names such "corporate services", "economic development" etc.53 These 
committees report to the council.          
 
As indicated in chapter one, councillors have the responsibility to make important 
decisions through voting and adopt resolutions on policy matters, legislation etc.54  
Because of the role and function of the council, councilors, as members of the council, 
are responsible for ensuring that the mandate of the council is implemented and 
realized.     
 
It is common practice among councillors to first discuss and debate issues in party 
caucuses. Once a decision has been taken in the caucus, party members are usually 
expected to vote in the council according to party lines.55 The process is very partisan in 
nature as councillors tend to impose the implementation of caucus ‘resolutions’ at all 
costs even if it means going against the legal framework established for holding 
meetings. This partisan behaviour, more often than not, negatively affects proper 
decision-making of the municipality.56 According to De Visser et al, the decision-making 
of political structures is negatively affected by this very strict culture of party discipline.57 
Sometimes caucus resolutions are themselves illegal and ill-advised and councillors 
base their votes on the strength of these resolutions.58 The question is then whether or 
not councillors can be held personally liable for abuse of power. 
 
                                            
53 Steytler N & De Visser J (2011) 3-42. 
54 SALGA (2006) 50. 
55 SALGA (2006) 50. 
56 De Visser Steytler & May A Study into the Functionality of Municipal Governance Arrangements (2009) 
34,available at<www.communitylawcentre.org.za>[Accessed 25 September 2012]. 
57 De Visser Steytler & May A Study into the Functionality of Municipal Governance Arrangements (2009) 
34. 
58 Vuyo Mlokothi v Amothole District municipality(1428/2008) [2008] ZAECHC 184; 2009 (6) SA 354 
(ECD) (6 November 2008). 
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2.4. Individual Liability  
The Oxford Dictionary defines the term ‘liability’ as meaning a state of being liable. It 
posits that being liable is to be responsible in law for something that you have done or 
failed to do.59 Briefly stated 'liability' entails a legal responsibility.60Individual liability, 
therefore, means to be personally responsible for something you have done or failed to 
do. A similar meaning was given to the term in the case of Mayfield v First National 
Bank of Chattanooga.61 According to the Court, 
“[l]iability is a broad legal term which is usually held to include every kind of 
legal obligation, responsibility or duty, certainly all that are measured by money 
obligation. Liability may arise from contract, express or implied, from a duty 
imposed by law, or by judgment of a court, or as a consequence of tort 
committed."62 
 
A distinction has to be made between individual criminal liability and individual civil 
liability. The latter refers to potential responsibility for payment of damages or other 
court enforcement in a lawsuit while the former refers to punishment for a crime.63 This 
study focuses on applicability of liability to councillors for unlawful decisions they adopt 
in council meetings. The study, therefore focuses on individual civil liability. 
 
2.4.1. Rationale for individual liability 
As indicated above, the council is a deliberative assembly and decisions in this body are 
made through voting. Councillors are free to make their points and arguments in such 
meetings. What is problematic in this setting is the tendency of councillors to abuse 
such voting system and adopt unlawful decisions. This kind of conduct defeats the 
purpose for which such right was granted. This tendency further, results in a council that 
is dysfunctional and paralyses the decision making in the municipal council. The 
                                            
59 Soanes C Stevenson A (2006) Concise Oxford English Dictionary (11th ed) 820. 
60 Soanes C Stevenson A (2006) 820. 
61 Mayfield v First National Bank of Chattanooga 137 F. 2d 1113 (1943). 
62 Mayfield v First National Bank of Chattanooga 137 F. 2d 1113 (1943). 
63 Hill and Hill (2005) 1. 
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rationale for holding councillors individually liable is based on the idea that when there is 
a sanction imposed against voting for and supporting unlawful decisions, councillors 
would be reluctant in engaging in such activities as there will be a heavy price to pay. 
 
The dearth of literature on individual liability of councillors in South Africa compels one 
to explore commentary from other jurisdictions. Lawson, commenting on the English 
local government framework, submits that councillors are not usually personally liable 
for decisions they take and that municipalities themselves would take responsibility for 
any such liability.64 Lawson further submits that there are, however, a few 
circumstances where a council member, or officer, can incur such liability. For example, 
if a council member votes on a matter in which he has a personal financial interest, then 
he may incur a penalty. Secondly, councillors are liable if they are present at a meeting 
that discusses a proposal that is contrary to the law and they do not vote against the 
unlawful proposal.  
 
Britten, on the other hand, commenting on the Australian local government legal 
framework, submits that “councillors and council officers are far from immunity from civil 
and criminal personal liability”.65He states that in a limited number of cases, a councillor 
or a council officer has been found personally liable for such offences.66 However, as 
the level of responsibility placed on individual councillors has increased, the potential 
liability that coincides with the undertaking of such responsibility is also amplified.67 
Therefore, according to Britten, municipal councillors can in certain circumstances be 
held individually liable for the unlawful decisions they take. 
 
                                            
64 Lawson RW 'Councillors legal liabilities and obligations'(2004)  available at: 
<http://www.bromleytransport.org.uk> [accessed on 02/07/2010] 4. 
65 Britten S 'Are you immune from liability? Councillors and council officers’ personal liability' (2008) 14(2) 
Local Government Law Journal 100. 
66 Britten S (2008) 100. 
67 Britten S (2008) 108. 
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There are some legislative initiatives embarked upon by the legislature to attempt to 
tackle this growing problem of abuse of decision-making power. One of the legislative 
interventions that this study examines is section 176 of the MFMA. 
 
2.4.2. Scope of application of section 176 of the MFMA 
For the purpose of this study, as well as for ease of reference, it is important to 
reproduce the provisions of section 176:   
(1) No municipality or any of its political structures, political office-bearers or 
officials, no municipal entity or its board of directors or any of its directors or officials, 
and no other organ of state or person exercising a power or performing a function in 
terms of this Act, is liable in respect of any loss or damage resulting from the exercise 
of that power or the performance of that function in good faith. 
 
(2) Without limiting liability in terms of the common law or other legislation, a 
municipality may recover from a political office-bearer or official of the municipality, 
and a municipal entity may recover from a director or official of the entity, any loss or 
damage suffered by it because of the deliberate or negligent unlawful actions of that 
political office-bearer or official when performing a function of office. 
 
It is clear from the provisions of section 176(1) that the section applies to all those 
institutions and functionaries referred to therein. The institutions and functionaries 
mentioned in section 176(1) are not liable for any loss, provided that they have acted in 
good faith. Section 176(1),does not make specific reference to ordinary individual 
councillors. The question that arises then is whether or not councillors are covered by 
section 176(1).  Answering this question would require one to discuss and explain the 
institutions and functionaries mentioned in section 176(1). 
 
The first institution that is exempted from liability is a municipality.  A municipality is 
defined as an organ of state within the local sphere of government exercising legislative 
and executive authority.68 But this definition of municipality makes no reference to 
councillors. The only closest reference to councillors relates to the “political office 
bearers” who, as indicated above, are also exempted from liability for loss suffered. 
                                            
68 Section 2 of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000.  
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However, a “political office bearer”, according to the Municipal Systems Act, means the 
speaker, executive mayor, deputy executive mayor, mayor, deputy mayor or a member 
of the executive committee.”69 From this, it is also clear that political office bearers are 
'special councillors' and not ordinary councillors. The fact that only political office 
bearers are mentioned in section 176(1) does not support the argument that all 
councillors are covered under this particular section.  
 
Another entity that is exempted from liability is a political structure. In terms of section 1 
of the Municipal Systems Act, a political structure, in relation to a municipality, means, 
“[t]he council of the municipality or any committee or other collective structure of a 
municipality, designated or appointed in terms of a specific provision of the Municipal 
structures Act”.70 As mentioned in chapter one, the council of the municipality is made 
up of councillors. But the term ‘council’ also makes no reference to individual 
councillors. The question is whether or not, by referring to political structures, the 
section is envisaging individual councillors or councillors as members of a collective 
body, the council. If a political structure envisaged in section 176(1) refers to councillors 
as a collective (as members of the council), then we are not referring to individual 
liability but collective responsibility.   
 
This question warrants the need to explain what is meant by collective liability or 
responsibility. Collective responsibility, in the context of cabinet ministers, means “that 
ministers act in unison to the outside world and carry joint responsibility before 
parliament for the way in which each member exercises and performs powers and 
functions.”71 This means that the cabinet as a whole is liable to parliament and not 
ministers in their individual capacity. By the same token, in the context of local 
government, the same argument applies to the municipal council, in that it is not 
individual councillors who are exempted from liability but the council as a collective 
                                            
69 Section 1 of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
70 Section 1 of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
71 Rauntenbach IM  Malherbe EFJ Constitutional Law 5ed (2009) 193. 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
body. That is of course, provided that the term 'political structure' is interpreted to refer 
to councillors as collectives. 
 
In the case of Willem Heyneke v Umhlathuze Municipality,72 the council of Umhlathuze 
Municipality adopted an unlawful resolution to place the municipal manager on paid 
special leave contrary to provisions of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 ("LRA").  
The court held that all the councillors who supported and voted in favour of the unlawful 
resolution were individually liable in terms of section 176 for the loss suffered as a result 
of the unlawful resolution they adopted. The court imputed liability to the individual 
councillors who supported the resolution and not the council as collective. In view of the 
Willem Heyneke case, this study contends that individual councillors are part of the 
functionaries mentioned in section 176(1).This means that they cannot be held liable for 
any loss or damage if they perform their functions in good faith. 
 
2.4.2.1. The meaning of good faith and its implications. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that section 176 applies to councillors as individual 
members of the council. From a reading of section 176(1), it is also clear that councillors 
do enjoy immunity from personal liability. This immunity is not, however, absolute.  
Councillors are not liable under section 176(1) only if they can prove that the conduct 
that resulted in loss or damage to the municipality was done in ‘good faith’. The 
question is, then, what is meant by 'good faith'.  
 
The term ‘good faith’ is not defined anywhere in the MFMA and a proper understanding 
of this term is important in the determination of liability in terms of the section176.  It is 
derived from the translation of the Latin term bona fide and courts often use the two 
terms interchangeably.73The Encarta Dictionary (English U.K) defines the term to mean 
“an honest intent”; “an intention of behaving honestly”; “the intention of behaving in an 
                                            
72 Willem Heyneke v Umhlathuze Municipality JOL 25625 (LC).  This case will be discussed in greater 
detail later in this chapter. 
73 http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/good+faith. 
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honest and sincere way”.74 Good faith is also defined as an “abstract and 
comprehensive term that encompasses a sincere belief or motive without any malice or 
the desire to defraud others.”75 
One way to understand the term 'good faith' is to appreciate its opposite, namely bad 
faith (mala fide). Councillors would be individually liable for the loss suffered by the 
municipality if they acted in bad faith. De Ville, referring to organs of state, argues that, 
bad faith exists if the organ of state claims to be acting for one purpose but knowingly 
acts for another private or public interest out of, say, spite or ill will or to benefit the 
organ or its relations.”76 Wiechers also observes that, "bad faith can be presumed on a 
balance of probabilities if the evidence clearly indicates that the organ of state not only 
misconceived its powers and misjudged the facts, but should also have realised or did 
in fact realise that it was performing an invalid act.”77 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that bad faith consists of two components.  First, in 
order for bad faith to exist, there must be unlawful conduct on the part of an organ of 
state. However, the unlawful conduct is not enough to establish the existence of bad 
faith. It must also be demonstrated that the organ or person had knowledge that it is 
performing an invalid act or its conduct is unlawful.  
 
In the case of Willem Heyneke78, bad faith on the part of councillors in the decision-
making process of Umhlathuze Municipality was at the heart of the matter. On 23 
September 2009, the Chief Whip wrote a letter to the council of the municipality, 
requesting it to place Mr. Heyneke on special leave pending an investigation into 
causes of what is termed the “cash crisis” and other concerns of the municipality. These 
other concerns involved allegations of fraud in land sales and deviations from council 
policy. The Speaker consulted Mr Heyneke and the latter agreed to be placed on 
                                            
74 The Encarta Dictionary: English (U.K.). 
75 The Encarta Dictionary: English (U.K.). 
76 De Ville JR Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa (2003) 175. 
77 Wiechers M Administrative Law (1985) 257. 
78 Willem Heyneke v Umhlathuze Municipality JOL 25625 (LC).   
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special leave on the understanding that it will be for a short period of time. In a council 
meeting, a majority decision was taken to place the Mr Heyneke on special leave. This 
resolution did not enjoy a smooth passage. Certain councillors opposed the resolution 
on procedural and substantive grounds. When the speaker placed the matter on vote, 
the DA and IFP members refused to be party to the decision. Twenty-eight councillors 
left the meeting and thirty-one remained to vote in favour of the resolution. In the same 
meeting, the council reviewed and declared unlawful two decisions taken by Mr 
Heyneke, namely the decisions to appoint human resources and administrative 
managers on the basis that he exceeded his authority as he had delegated the power to 
appoint these managers to the Deputy City Manager. The council did not charge Mr 
Heyneke for misconduct on the two unlawful decisions he took. It, instead, placed him 
on special leave pending investigations into the ‘cash crises.   
The principal issue was whether the resolution regarding special leave was lawful. The 
Court discussed the law applicable to special leave and held that leave, according to the 
policy, is ‘granted to’ and not ‘issued against’ employees. The council may prescribe the 
period and conditions of special leave but not special leave itself.79 The Court held that 
the resolution is unlawful because the employee’s contract, read together with the 
legislation and the policy on special leave, do not allow the municipality to impose leave 
on him. Furthermore, the Court stated that the municipality’s proclaimed purpose of the 
imposition of special leave, namely to conduct investigations, is not the true purpose.80 
The court went on to deal with the existence of bad faith in the resolution of placing the 
applicant on special leave. According to the Court,  
a. [t]hose responsible for the decision to put the employee on special leave have an 
ulterior motive for the following reasons: 
i. The municipality decided to put the employee on special leave pending 
investigations before determining the reasons for such investigations. 
ii. The municipality did not apply its mind to the special leave resolution.81 
                                            
79 Willem Heyneke v Umhlathuze MunicipalityJOL 25625 (LC) para 31. 
80 Willem Heyneke v Umhlathuze MunicipalityJOL 25625 (LC) para 130. 
81 Willem Heyneke v Umhlathuze MunicipalityJOL 25625 (LC) para 130. 
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According to the Court, ulterior motive and bad faith can sometimes overlap because 
they encompass a range of elements such as fraud, unreasonableness, arbitrariness, 
dishonesty, a failure to apply one’s mind, etc.82 The Court went on to say that the 
connection between the special leave and the disciplinary proceedings evidences bad 
faith.  In finding bad faith on the part of the council, the court found that  
[t]he special leave is a façade for suspending the employee pending misconduct 
proceedings. By putting the employee on special leave and persisting with it, knowing 
that it is for the purpose of effectively suspending him for the acts of misconduct that he 
has been found guilty on is bad faith.”83 Further, the municipality used the power aimed at 
benefiting employees as a weapon against the employee. It misconstrued and misused 
its power for the purpose not authorised in law and continues to do so despite being 
alerted to the unlawfulness and continued misuse of power is bad faith.84 
The special leave resolution, according to the Court, was irrational, unreasonable and 
disproportionately prejudicial to the employee, Mr. Heyneke, and the public interest.85 
 
In light of the above, it is fair to conclude that the existence of bad faith in the conduct of 
councillors performing acts in terms of the MFMA is central to the possible liability of 
councillors in terms of section 176. In other words, if an unlawful resolution was adopted 
by the council in bad faith, the councillors who supported such an unlawful resolution 
(with the full knowledge of its unlawfulness) would be held individually liable. However, if 
the said resolution was adopted in good faith even though the resolution is unlawful, 
councillors would be exempted from any liability. 
 
2.4.2.2. The consequences individual liability of councillors 
Now that we have established that councillors can incur personal liability if it is shown 
that they acted in bad faith, the question that should be answered is what 
                                            
82 Willem Heyneke v Umhlathuze Municipality JOL 25625 (LC) para 58. 
83 Willem Heyneke v Umhlathuze Municipality JOL 25625 (LC) para 91. 
84 Willem Heyneke v Umhlathuze Municipality JOL 25625 (LC) para 92. 
85 Willem Heyneke v Umhlathuze Municipality JOL 25625 (LC) para 92. 
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consequences, if any, flow from such liability. Section 176(2) of the MFMA, enunciates 
the consequences that flow from the liability provided for in section 176(1) of the MFMA.  
It provides that office bearers and functionaries are liable for the loss or damage if such 
loss or damage is suffered as a result of negligent or deliberate actions by these 
individuals. The municipality may recover the loss or damage suffered from the 
functionaries mentioned in section 176(2).   
The problem is that section 176(2) of the MFMA, only mentions political office bearers 
or officials, and officials of municipal entities. Does this mean that the municipality may 
recover the loss or damage suffered only from these persons and not from the other 
institutions referred to in section 176(1)? Put differently, the question is whether the 
municipality may recover the loss or damage suffered from ordinary councillors as 
well.86 
The Court in Willem Heyneke answered this question in the affirmative.  In this case, it 
was clear that the resolution was taken in bad faith. The Court held that bad faith and 
unlawfulness are grounds that entitle a municipality to recover any loss or damage it 
suffers from political office bearers and officials in terms of section 176.87When the court 
considered the relief to be granted in that case, it based its decision on section 176(2) of 
the MFMA. The Court decided that all those councillors responsible for placing the 
applicant on special leave must be held accountable for their actions.88The municipality 
was mandated by the court to establish the following:  
which councillors and officials were responsible for the decision; the extent of each 
person’s responsibility for the special leave; the amount the municipality should 
recover from each person; and the reasons for electing not to recover from any 
person.   
 
The Court warned that even though the councillors who voted to place the applicant on 
special leave constitute a majority in the council and as such might not be enthusiastic 
                                            
86 Meaning those councillors who are not office bearers. 
87 Willem Heyneke v Umhlathuze Municipality JOL 25625 (LC) para 135. 
88 Willem Heyneke v Umhlathuze Municipality JOL 25625 (LC) para 139. 
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about recovering losses from themselves, they are publicly accountable for the 
decisions in terms of section 176 of the MFMA. The court went on to say that if the 
councillors do not do what is required by statute, they could be in contempt of the 
order.”89 
 
It follows from the Willem Heyneke case that section 176 allows municipalities to 
recover loss or damage caused by bad decision-making by the structures listed in the 
section including councillors. The application of section 176(2) is not restricted to the 
persons listed in section 176(2). The municipality can also recover the loss or damage 
suffered from individual councillors.  
 
Finally, the individual councillors who voted in favour of the unlawful resolution were 
found individually liable for the votes cast. Therefore, individual liability in terms of 
section 176 arises when a councillor or councillors have voted in support of an unlawful 
resolution and had knowledge of the unlawfulness of the said resolution. In addition to 
the knowledge of unlawfulness, if municipality suffers loss as a result of such resolution, 
then individual liability would arise. The Willem Heyneke case is instructive in 
determining the consequences of liability of councillors and other functionaries on the 
basis of section 176. If the councillor's action or omission resulted in a financial loss for 
the municipality, the councillor is ordered to pay for the loss suffered by the municipality 
as a result of the councillor’s actions. This, for example, may include legal costs if the 
matter ended up in court.  
 
In addition to liability of councillors envisaged in section 176 of the MFMA,90 there are 
recent legislative developments that are intended to minimize abuse of decision-making 
power in local government. One such legislative milestone is the Local Government: 
Municipal Systems Amendment Act, 7 of 2011. In the next section the study examines 
                                            
89 Willem Heyneke v Umhlathuze Municipality JOL 25625 (LC) para 137. 
90 Section 176(2) of the MFMA, makes it clear that the liability under the MFMA does not exclude or 
replace any liability under common law. Thus if the functionaries and institutions mentioned in the section 
could be liable at common law, such liability is not replaced by the provisions of section 176 of the MFMA.    
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whether the amendments introduced by the Act address the problem of abuse of 
decision-making power in local government.  
 
2.5. The Local Government: Systems Amendment Act, 7 of 2011 
The Local Government: Systems Amendment Act, 7 of  2011 (the "Act") amends certain 
provisions in the Municipal Systems Act and addresses the various inconsistencies that 
exist in the current Municipal Systems Act. The Act was introduced to provide inter alia, 
for procedures and competency criteria for the appointment of municipal managers and 
managers directly accountable to municipal managers, to require all staff systems of the 
municipality to be consistent with uniform standards determined by the Minister by 
regulation, to bar municipal managers and managers directly accountable to them from 
holding political office in political parties and to regulate duties, remuneration, benefits 
and other terms of employment for municipal managers and managers directly 
accountable to them.91 The municipal council appoints senior management of the 
municipality and there are provisions that the council ought to follow in exercising its 
decision-making powers appointing senior managers in terms of the Act. This study 
focuses on the provisions that prohibit councillors from taking decisions or purporting to 
take decisions in a manner that is contrary to the provisions of the Act. 
 
Section 14of the Act amends Schedule 192 of the Municipal Systems Act93 by inserting 
the following provisions after item 2 Schedule 1 of the Municipal Systems Act: “a 
councilor may not vote in favour of a resolution before the council or a committee of the 
council which conflicts with any legislation applicable to local government.” There is, 
thus a clear legal prohibition on councillors prohibiting them from voting in favour of 
unlawful decisions. What is the possible impact of this provision on the decision-making 
power of the councillors? Put differently, the question is: what are the consequences 
that flow from voting in favour of resolutions that are in conflict with “any legislation 
applicable to local government”. 
                                            
91 The Preamble to the Local Government: Systems Amendment Act 7 of 2011.  
92 Schedule 1 of the Municipal Systems Act contains the Code of Good Conduct for Councillors.  
93 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
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As indicated earlier, section 14 is an insertion to Schedule 1 of the Municipal Systems 
Act. As such, the consequences flowing from voting contrary to "any legislation 
applicable to local government" are provided for in item 14 of Schedule 1 of the 
Municipal Systems Act. Item 14 of Schedule 1 deals with procedures that the council 
may follow if it is alleged that a councillor has breached any provision of the Code of 
Good Conduct for Councillors. In terms of item 14, a municipal council may investigate 
and make a finding on any alleged breach of a provision of the Code.94 Alternatively, the 
council may establish a special committee to investigate and make a finding on any 
alleged breach and make appropriate recommendation to the council.95If the council or 
the special committee finds that the said councillor or councillors have breached a 
provision of the Code96 (by, for instance, voting in favour of a resolution which conflicts 
with any legislation applicable to local government), the council may issue a formal 
warning to the councillor,97and it may reprimand the said councillor.98 The Code further 
provides that council may request the MEC for Local Government in the province to 
suspend the councillor for a certain period.99 Furthermore, the council may fine the 
councillor and request the MEC to remove the incumbent from office.100 
 
It is important to note that section 14 of the Act not only prohibits voting in support of 
resolutions in conflict with the Municipal Systems Act but voting in conflict with any101 
legislation application to local government. As such, if councillors vote in favour of 
resolutions that are in conflict with the MFMA, the Structures Act, the Constitution and 
other legislation applicable to local government, they would not escape liability in terms 
of the Code.  
                                            
94 Schedule 1 of the Municipal Systems Act, Item 14(1)(a) of the Code of Good Conduct for Councillors. 
95 Item 14(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Code of Good Conduct for Councillors. 
96 Item 14(2) of the Code of Good Conduct for Councillors. 
97 Item 14(2)(a) of the Code of Good Conduct for Councillors. 
98 Item 14(2)(b)of the Code of Good Conduct for Councillors . 
99 Item 14(2)(c)of the Code of Good Conduct for Councillors . 
100 Item 14(2)(d) and (e) of the Code of Good Conduct for Councillors. 
101 My emphasis added.  
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It is submitted that section 14 of creates another form of liability of councillors in addition 
to liability for legal costs which flow from legal proceedings and section 176 of the 
MFMA. The kind of liability introduced by section 14 of the Act and item 14 of the Code 
flows from action taken by the council itself. The council is in a position to discipline the 
transgressing councillor(s). In terms of item 14 of the Code, the council is empowered to 
discipline its own members for abuse of voting power. Wigley refers to this power of the 
council as the Authorisation Model.102 In terms of this model parliament has the authority 
to investigate the conduct on its members, charge its members for voting in a certain 
manner and ultimately discipline the incumbents or recommend legal proceedings 
against them.103 The adoption of this model is commendable as it contributes to the 
attempt to root out abuse of decision-making power vested in the municipal council and 
its committees. As such, the provisions of section 14 of the Act will go a long way in 
ensuring sound decision-making in local government.   
 
The wordings of item 14 of the Code suggest that the implementation of the measures 
envisaged in the latter are left to the discretion of the council. This is evident from the 
use of the term 'may' in item 14. From a practical point of view, the council can decide to 
act or not act against a certain councillor(s) even though the incumbent(s) have 
breached the provisions of the Code. In municipalities where the majority councillors are 
members of the same political party, it may be difficult to implement provisions of item 
14 of the Code. If the majority councillors vote in support of a resolution which conflicts 
with any legislation applicable to local government, the council may have problems in 
investigating the alleged breach as it would have to pass a resolution authorizing the 
investigation, which can only be taken by way of majority voting. The study contends 
that the alleged transgressors may not be enthusiastic to adopt a resolution that 
                                            
102 Wigley S  'Parliamentary Immunity: Protecting Democracy or Protecting Corruption?' 11 (1) The 
Journal of Political Philosophy available at 
<www.bilkent.edu.tr/~wigley/SimonWigleyParliamentaryImmunity.pdf> [accessed on 20/02/2011] (2003) 
37-38. 
103 Wigley S (2003) 37-38. 
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appears to challenge their actions, making the measure less effective. 
 
2.6. Concluding remarks 
This chapter has examined the provisions of section 176 of the MFMA and concluded 
that the section creates statutory liability for individual councillors and other 
functionaries mentioned in the section. It is further established that liability created by 
section 176 is individual liability for the loss or damage suffered by the municipality 
resulting from the conduct of a councillor or another functionary. It appears that 
individual liability provided for in this section would not apply to every situation where 
unlawfulness and bad faith exists. Individual liability in terms of section 176 would only 
apply if the councillor in question was performing a function in terms of the MFMA. Thus 
if a councillor was not performing an act in terms of the MFMA, the provisions of section 
176 would not find application to his or her conduct. The developments introduced by 
the Systems Amendment Act are a progressive legislative move towards proper 
exercise of the decision-making power that is vested in the council. It is submitted that 
individual liability of councillors is possible under the provisions of section 14 of the Act 
read together with item 14 of the Code. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Privilege and immunity of councillors 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In chapter 2, the study explored the applicability of the provisions of section 176 of the 
MFMA to individual councillors and concluded that the provisions of the said section do 
apply to councillors. The study also concluded that liability, in terms of section 176 of 
the MFMA, is only restricted to acts performed in terms of the Act.  In chapter 2 the 
study went on to analyse the legislative developments brought about by the Systems 
Amendment Act in so far as they are relevant to the determination of liability of 
councillors. Further, the legislative developments introduced by the Act, go a long way 
in ensuring that abuse of decision-making power vested in the council is minimised. 
 
However, it would be unfair to expect councillors to be flawless and not err in making 
decisions in council on behalf of the municipality. To guard against an untenable 
situation of imputing liability on councillors for the performance of their functions, the 
legislature established legal framework affording privileges and immunities to 
councillors. This chapter discusses the nature and extent of privileges and immunities 
afforded to councillors in section 28 of the Municipal Structures Act. It seeks to 
determine the conduct of councillors that is not subject to liability. In order to achieve its 
objective, the study commences the discussion by briefly touching on the rational basis 
for privileges and immunities. It then proceeds to discuss section 28 of the Municipal 
Structures Act in order to determine the scope and extent of privileges and immunities 
councillors enjoy at local government level.  
 
The study will also highlight the major problems that seem to fuel and influence abuse 
of decision-making power in local government. The study contends that partisan 
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behavior or party discipline as well as political party contestations are some of the major 
obstacles to the proper functioning of the municipal council.   
 
3.2. Definition of privilege and immunity 
For the purposes of achieving conceptual clarity, it is necessary to define these 
concepts at the outset. Curzon defines immunity as “freedom or exemption from some 
obligation, penalty, or power of another.”104 Similarly, Stewart states that immunity refers 
to “freedom from obligation or duty, especially exemption from legal liability.”105  On the 
other hand, privilege is defined as “a right or immunity in connection with legal 
proceedings upon a person by virtue of his position.”106  According to Curzon, the word 
‘privilege’ refers to “a special right or immunity, conferred to some person or body, e.g. 
members of parliament.”107  Curzon further submits that “it is protection attaching to 
certain statements, which would otherwise be defamatory, so that no action lies even 
though the statements might have been false and malicious e.g. statements made in 
debates in parliament.”108From the foregoing, it is apparent that the words ‘privilege’ and 
‘immunity’ referto the same thing, namely the protection enjoyed by members of 
legislative assemblies when executing their functions. They can, thus be used 
interchangeably. 
 
3.3. Rationale for affording privilege and immunity 
Parliamentary immunity is a long standing practice in the world. Its recognition can be 
traced to as early as 1689 in the English Bill of Rights.  Article 9 of the Bill that "declares 
                                            
104 Curzon LB Dictionary of Law 6 ed (2002) 208. 
105 Stewart WJ Collins dictionary of law 2 ed (2001) 200. A similar definition is provided in Oxford 
Dictionary. Immunity is defined as “a freedom or exemption from an obligation, a penalty, or an 
unfavourable circumstance. 
106 Stewart WL (2001) 310. 
107 Curzon LB (2002) 333. 
108 Curzon LB (2002) 333. A similar definition is provided in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (11th 
ed) ("Oxford Dictionary"). The Oxford Dictionary,defines the word ‘privilege’ as “a right, advantage, or 
immunity, belonging to a person, class or office.”  It is “the freedom of members of a legislative assembly 
when speaking in its meetings.”     
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the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in parliament ought not to be 
impeached or questioned in any court or place out of parliament.”109The nature of the 
work of members of legislative assemblies warrants protection in the form of privileges 
and immunities.   
 
Today, legislative representative assemblies have a multitude of functions that require 
immunity (i.e. the oversight, legislative, representative, and disciplinary functions).  
Privileges and immunities guarantee the integrity of parliament’s procedure and 
discourse, as well as the integrity of its elected members and its officials.110 It is now 
well-established that legislative assemblies require certain privileges and immunity from 
legal action in order to discharge their responsibilities effectively.111 
 
“The institution of parliamentary immunity is designed to ensure the proper operation of a 
parliament: It confers specific rights and privileges to members of parliament, most 
importantly the privilege of freedom of speech. Indeed, freedom of expression is the working 
tool of members of parliament which enables them to do their job as representatives of the 
people, legislating, adopting the budget and overseeing the activities of the government. If 
they cannot speak out, criticize the government and investigate and denounce abuses 
because they fear reprisals by the executive branch or other powerful actors, they cannot 
live up to their role. Freedom of speech enables them to raise questions affecting the public 
good which might be difficult to voice elsewhere owing to the possibility of court action. They 
require immunity to freely express themselves without obstruction and without fear of 
prosecution or harassment of any kind.”112 
 
From the foregoing, it is evident that freedom of expression in deliberative assemblies, 
such as parliament, is of paramount importance to ensure proper functioning of 
                                            
109 A discussion document for the Rules Committee, (1999)7, available at <www.pmg.org.za/.../19990905-
joint-subcommittee-powers-and-privi> [accessed on 14 May 2010]. See also Article 9 of the English Bill of 
Rights of 1689. 
110 A discussion document for the Rules Committee, (1999) 7. 
111 A discussion document for the Rules Committee, (1999)7.  
112 Inter-Parliamentary Union 'Parliamentary – Immunity' (2006) 3, available at  http:// 
<www.docstoc.com/docs/7228192/>. 
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parliament.  It is important to note that what is emphasized here is the instrumental role 
of freedom of expression in legislative assemblies. For members of parliament to 
effectively perform their oversight, legislative and representative functions, it is 
necessary that they enjoy privilege and immunity from legal action resulting from the 
performance of their functions and business of parliament. It is also clear that freedom 
of expression is instrumental to the work of legislative assemblies for proper functioning 
and effective discharge of their duties.  
 
Even though immunity is in principle intended to promote active deliberations within 
legislative bodies such as the council, it is not immune from abuse by those entitled to it.  
According to Simon Wigley, the problem posed by immunity is that it affords each 
representative greater scope to pursue their own personal and political interest over and 
above that which is made possible simply by their position of influence.113 Wigley further 
maintains that it is this undemocratic possibility that might incline citizens to wish for the 
immunity to be curtailed.114 The abuse of the parliamentary immunity has led many 
countries to reduce the scope of immunity while a vast number of other jurisdictions are 
considering doing so. According to Wigley, the principal reason behind this trend is that 
the only telling way to prevent the decision-making process from falling prey to the 
quest for self-enrichment, election success and other untended possibilities, is to render 
elected representatives vulnerable to the threat of legal inquiry and sanction.115 
 
Contrary to the view of reducing the scope of immunity enjoyed by members of 
legislative assemblies, there is an argument that insists on providing absolute 
parliamentary immunity. This argument rests on the fact that immunity is intended to 
promote free debate and expression. Subjecting councillors to the full thrust of legal 
inquiry for action taken in the course of their mandate is not a plausible approach either. 
In view of this conundrum, Wigley suggests that the problem that democracies face is 
                                            
113 Wigley S (2003) 23.   
114 Wigley S (2003) 23. 
115 Wigley S (2003) 24. 
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one of striking the right balance between protecting elected representatives from legal 
inquiry and limiting the possibility that they will neglect their democratic purpose.116 
 
3.4. Privilege and immunity in South Africa 
In South Africa, privileges and immunities of members of parliament, for both national 
and provincial government, are provided for in the Constitution in sections 58, 71and 
117. Section 58 provides for privileges of cabinet members, deputy Ministers and 
members of the National Assembly. Section 71 provides the same for the Delegates to 
the National Council of Provinces ("NCOP") and persons referred to in sections 66117 
and 67118 of the Constitution. On the other hand, section 117 provides privileges to 
members of a provincial legislature and permanent delegates to the NCOP. It is 
submitted that South Africa affords privileges and immunities to legislative assemblies 
for similar reasons advanced above, namely to allow members of deliberative 
assemblies to discharge their function properly.119 
 
The privileges and protection envisaged in section 58 of the Constitution were put to a 
test in the case of De Lille and Another v Speaker of the National Assembly.120 De Lille, 
who was then a member of the National Assembly, made a statement in the assembly 
suggesting that certain members of the African National Congress ("ANC") had been 
informers for the pre 1994 apartheid government. The ANC then used its parliamentary 
majority to pass a resolution suspending De Lille as punishment for her controversial 
statement. The suspension imposed against De Lille was not authorised by the rules of 
the assembly. The court held that the resolution was unconstitutional as it violated De 
Lille's right to freedom of speech in the Assembly.121Justice Hlophe held that the 
freedom of expression envisaged in section 58 of the Constitution was not subject to 
                                            
116 Wigley S (2003) 24, para 3. 
117 The persons referred to in this section are Cabinet Ministers and Deputy Ministers. 
118 The persons referred to in this section are part time representatives of the NCOP. 
119 Inter-Parliamentary Union 'Parliamentary – Immunity' (2006) 2-3. 
120 De Lille and Another v Speaker of the National Assembly1998 (7) BCLR 929 (C). 
121 De Lille and Another v Speaker of the National Assembly1998 (7) BCLR 929 (C) 35. 
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general limitation under section 36 of the Constitution, but could be limited only in terms 
of the rules and orders of the Assembly.122 
 
As noted by Chaskalson et al the strict reading and application of section 58 by the 
court in the above case has to be commended.123 This is so because freedom of speech 
in parliament is essential to the political process. Chaskalson et al says that the proper 
functioning of representative democracy depends on members of parliament having the 
freedom to speak openly in parliament.124 Any issue which is placed beyond the 
protection of freedom of speech in parliament is an issue which cannot be addressed by 
the political process. If members of parliament do not know what they can or cannot say 
in parliament without exposing themselves to liability, they will tend towards self-
censorship. It is submitted that this will be detrimental to the proceedings and debates in 
parliament.125 This shows how instrumental freedom of speech is to the functioning of 
parliament. Further, it is clear that parliamentarians require protection in the form of 
immunity from legal inquiry in order to engage in the business of parliament. This study 
is not going to discuss privileges and immunities afforded to members of national and 
provincial parliaments. The primary focus of this paper is local government, the 
municipal council, in particular. In the ensuing paragraphs, we discuss and analyse 
privileges and immunities at local government level.       
 
3.5. Privilege and immunity at local government level: legislative framework 
As indicated in chapter one, the legislative and executive authority of the municipality is 
vested in the municipal council.126 This means that the municipal council serves both as 
the legislature and the executive. Section 161 of the Constitution provides provincial 
legislation with the framework of national legislation may provide for privileges and 
                                            
122 De Lille and Another v Speaker of the National Assembly 1998 (7) BCLR 929 (C) 35. 
123 Chaskalson M and Klaaren J 'National government' in Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South 
Africa (1999) 3-28B. 
124 Chaskalson M and Klaaren J (1999) 3-28C. 
125 Chaskalson M and Klaaren J (1999) 3-28C. 
126 Section 151(2) of the Constitution. 
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immunities of municipal councils and their members. This national legislative framework 
is provided by the Municipal Structures Act.   
 
Prior the enactment of the Municipal Structures Act, there was no legislation that gave 
effect to the content of privileges and immunities contemplated in section 161 of the 
Constitution. The content of the privileges and immunity of councillors depended on the 
interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution as a whole. This was clear in the 
Waters v Khayalami Metropolitan Council ("KMC") decision.127 In that case the 
Witwatersrand Local division was asked to decide on the legality of the KMC's 
resolution to exclude councillor Mike Waters, the applicant, from council meetings for a 
period of 36 days. The disciplinary action was taken by the council in reaction to a 
statement made by the councillor in which he declared that information provided by the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) was incorrect. One of the issues to be determined by the 
court was freedom of expression within the framework established for local government 
by the Constitution. The Court held that whether or not the statement made by the 
councillor was true is immaterial. In deciding the case, the Court emphasized the 
importance of freedom of speech in councils' debates. According to the Court, free 
speech is a democratic principle and it should be promoted in councils’ debates. 
According to the Court, [t]o censure the applicant in the fashion complained of, for 
labeling information supplied by the CEO as 'incorrect', is to stifle freedom of expression 
and to restrict debate in council meetings. "This," according to the Court "militates 
against the fundamentals of democracy."128 
 
What should be noted from the foregoing is the fact that the court held that the 
councillor’s conduct was protected under the general constitutional right of freedom of 
expression in deliberative assemblies such as the council. In the absence of legislative 
framework that provides for the protection or immunity of certain conduct of councillors 
from any legal action, the court relied on the general constitutional framework 
established for local government. The court reasoned that one of the objects of local 
                                            
127 Waters v Khayalami Metropolitan Council 1997 (3) SA 476 (W). 
128 Waters v Khayalami Metropolitan Council 1997 (3) SA 476 (W): 491C-D. 
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government is to provide democratic and accountable government.129 Freedom of 
speech and the culture of open debate in the municipal council are essential to achieve 
democracy in local government, the court concluded.  
 
It goes without saying that freedom of expression in deliberative assemblies, such as 
the municipal council, is an important principle. This makes freedom of expression one 
of the rationales for affording privilege and immunity to councillors. The next section 
traces the move towards specific protection granted by the provisions of section 28 of 
Municipal Structure Act. It seeks to determine the scope and extent of privilege and 
immunity afforded to municipal councillors.  
 
3.5.1. Section 28 of the Municipal Structures Act  
The enactment the Municipal Structures Act, containing section 28, dealing with 
privilege and immunity of councillors, signifies a transition from the protection of 
councillors based on the general right to freedom of expression, to more specific 
protection. Section 28 provides the national framework for provincial legislation on 
privileges and immunities of councillors. It provides that the provincial legislation, in 
terms of section 161 of the Constitution, must provide at least:130 
(a) that councillors have freedom of speech in a municipal council and in its committees, subject to 
the rules and orders as envisaged in section 160(6) of the Constitution;131 
(b) that councillors are not liable to civil or criminal proceedings, arrest, imprisonment or damages 
for- 
(i) anything that they have said in, produced before or submitted to the council or any of its 
committees; or132 
(ii) anything revealed as a result of anything that they have said in, produced before or 
submitted to the council or any of its committees.133 
                                            
129 Waters v Khayalami Metropolitan Council 1997 (3) SA 476 (W): 491 E-I.  
130 My emphasis. 
131 Section 28(1)(a) of the Municipal Structures Act. 
132 Section 28(1)(b)(i)of the Municipal Structures Act. 
133 Section 28(1)(b)(ii) of the Municipal Structures Act. 
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Section 28(2) further states that in provinces, where the provincial legislation has not yet 
been enacted, section 28(1) of the structures Act applies as the basis for privileges and 
immunities of councils and councillors.134To date, only three provinces, namely 
Gauteng,135North West136and Free State,137 have promulgated the relevant provincial 
legislation on privileges and immunities of councillors. The Western Cape province has 
published the Privileges and Immunities Bill for public comment on 2 July 2010.   
 
In terms of section 28, councillors have a guaranteed right to freedom of speech in the 
municipal council and its committees. The significance of affording freedom of speech to 
legislative assemblies cannot be overemphasized. In addition to the general freedom of 
expression provision in the Constitution;138 councillors are now guaranteed freedom of 
speech in council business. However, freedom of speech in the council is not unlimited 
as it is subject to rules and orders established by the council.139  The power of the 
council to establish these rules and procedures is envisaged in section 160(6) of the 
Constitution. Section 160(6) provides that: 
A municipal council may make by-laws which prescribe rules and orders for- 
(a) its internal arrangements; 
(b) its business and proceedings; and  
(c) the establishment, composition, procedures, powers and functions of its committees.       
This means that if the council has adopted and passed by-laws which prescribe rules 
and orders that regulate the manner in which councillors may exercise their freedom of 
expression in council meetings and business, councillors have to exercise their freedom 
of expression according to those rules and orders. The rules and orders, however, 
should be guided by the Constitution and they should not confer upon the council, 
greater power than what is provided for in the Constitution.  
 
                                            
134 Section 28(2)of the Municipal Structures Act .   
135 Gauteng: Privileges and Immunities of Councillors Act 1 of 2002. 
136 North West Structures Act 3 of 2000. 
137 Free State: Privileges and Immunities of Municipal Councillors Act 2 of 2002. 
138 Section 16 of the Constitution. 
139 Section 28(1)(a) of the Municipal Structures Act. 
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3.5.1.1. The scope of privilege and immunity 
The important issue relating privilege and immunity pertains to the nature of the 
protected conduct as well as the place, occasion or proceedings at which the conduct 
must occur if it is to be protected.140Section 28(b)(ii) relates to immunity for anything 
revealed as result of the protected conduct in section 28(b)(i). The first case to test the 
provisions of section 28 is Swartbooi and others v Brink and another.141 In this case, the 
council of Nala Municipality ordered two councillors, Brink and Niewoudt, to temporarily 
‘recuse’ themselves from all activities of the council and desist from communicating with 
council officials pending an investigation into an allegedly improper transaction in which 
these councillors were allegedly involved in.  Following this decision, the Mayor made 
public statements about these councillors outside the council meeting, relating to issues 
which were under investigation. The two councillors then approached the High Court for 
an order setting the resolution of the council aside. The High Court set the resolution 
aside142 and it also ordered all the councillors who supported the resolution to personally 
pay the costs of the application. In the Constitutional Court, the appellants’ main 
submission was that section 161 of the Constitution and section 28 were central to a 
decision about the circumstances in which members of the council should be personally 
liable for the payment of costs of court proceedings.143 The appellants argued that they 
are immune from personal liability according to section 28 of the Municipal Structures 
Act. The Court discussed the applicability of section 28 to appellants and had to 
consider a number of arguments raised by the respondents. 
 
One of the issues that the Court had to determine was whether the provisions of section 
28 are applicable to all decision-making of the municipal council, including legislative, 
administrative and executive decision-making. In this case, the respondents submitted 
                                            
140 Section 28(1)(a) of the Municipal Structures Act. 
141 Swartbooi and others v Brink and another (2) 2003 (5) BCLR 502 (CC).  
142 The reason for setting the councils’ decision aside was because the municipal council had no power to 
effect suspension of councillors without approval of the MEC responsible for local government in the 
province of Free State. 
143 Swartbooi and others v Brink and another (2) 2003 (5) BCLR 502 (CC) para 7. 
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that section 28 must, in the context of our legislative history, be interpreted to protect 
only conduct that is integral to the legislative functioning of the council. The protection, 
they argued, does not extend to administrative or executive decision-making of the 
council.144 The Court disagreed with this argument. The Court noted that the legislative 
history of absolute privilege shows that parliamentary privilege came from England to 
South Africa and it applied only to the legislature and not the executive. But in South 
Africa, privileges and immunities derive from the Constitution, the supreme law of the 
Republic.145 In terms of the Constitution, the protection offered to councillors does not 
depend on the nature of the councillor’s functioning.146 Furthermore, section 161 of the 
Constitution does not specify the nature of the function for which privileges and 
immunities may be accorded. Therefore, the protection afforded to councillors in section 
28 cannot be limited to legislative functioning of council only. It also applies to 
administrative and executive decision-making functions of the council. Thus, according 
to the Swartbooi case, the nature of the functioning of the council is immaterial in 
determining the application of section 28 to the conduct of councillors.  
 
In relation to this, it must be noted that an issue was raised on whether the protection 
envisaged in section 28, extends to conduct in committees of the council. In the 
Swartbooi case it was argued by the respondents that section 28 exempts councillors 
from liability in relation to the council and its committees. This protection, the 
respondents argued, exceeds the parameters set by the Constitution, in that it provides 
a wider scope than the empowering provision of section 161 of the Constitution which 
does not refer to the committees of a council.147 The Court saw no need to address this 
issue as the conduct took place in a full council meeting. The Court, however, gave an 
indication that the function or purpose of a committee might well be relevant to the 
question whether a municipal councillor is exempt from liability for conduct which 
                                            
144 Swartbooi and others v Brink and another (2) 2003 (5) BCLR 502 (CC) para 13.  
145 Swartbooi and others v Brink and another (2) 2003 (5) BCLR 502 (CC) para 13. 
146 Swartbooi and others v Brink and another (2) 2003 (5) BCLR 502 (CC) para 14-16.  
147 Swartbooi and others v Brink and another (2) 2003 (5) BCLR 502 (CC) para 17. 
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amounts to participation in the affairs of the committee of a municipal council in a 
particular case.148 
 
More controversial is the issue of whether the conduct of councillors would enjoy the 
same protection if is performed outside the council meetings. The Court in Swartbooi, 
ruled that the statements made by the mayor outside the council meeting fell outside the 
protection offered by section 28 of the Municipal Structures Act. The Court, however, 
indicated that such conduct (i.e. statements made inside council meetings) would be 
protected only if it bears a relationship to the council. The Court went on to say that 
statements or submissions must be made to the council or items must be produced 
before the council149 and councillors must be participating in the affairs of a full council 
in the cause of legitimate business of the council.150 
 
This case illustrates the rational basis for affording immunity to councillors in respect of 
certain acts and votes in the municipal council, which is, in the words of Justice Yacoob, 
“to encourage vigorous and open debate in the process of decision-making.”151  
Furthermore this is fundamental to democracy, and any curtailment of debate would 
compromise democracy.”152 Based on that, the Court decided that immunity 
contemplated in section 28 does not apply to statements made outside the council. The 
question that follows is whether statements or conduct of councillors before provincial 
bodies are also excluded from the protection provided for in section 28. The case of 
Dikoko v Mokhatla153 is particularly relevant in answering this question.  
 
Dikoko v Mokhatlawas concerned with the ambit of the immunity offered to municipal 
councillors from civil liability when they testify at a meeting of a provincial legislature or 
                                            
148 Swartbooi v Brink and Another(2) 2003 (5) BCLR 502 (CC) para 17. 
149 Swartbooi v Brink and Another(2) 2003 (5) BCLR 502 (CC) para 10. 
150 Swartbooi v Brink and Another(2) 2003 (5) BCLR 502 (CC) para 16. 
151 Swartbooi v Brink and Another(2) 2003 (5) BCLR 502 (CC) para 16. 
152 Swartbooi v Brink and Another(2) 2003 (5) BCLR 502 (CC) para 20. 
153 Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC). 
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one of its committees.154 Mr Dikoko wasthe Executive Mayor of the South District 
Council in the North West Province. The Auditor-General of the province voiced his 
dissatisfaction with the unacceptable excess of R3,200 on the cell phone debt of Mr 
Dikoko. Mr Dikoko was then called to appear before the Provincial Standing Committee 
on Public Accounts to provide an explanation for this. In this committee, Mr Dikoko said 
that his overdue indebtedness was caused by Mr Mokhatla deliberately changing 
accounting procedures to exaggerate his indebtedness thereby giving his political 
opponents a basis for an attack on his integrity.155 Mr Mokhatla instituted a defamation 
action for damages in the High Court.Mr Dikoko raised two arguments in his defence. 
First, that section 161 and 117 of the Constitution, section 28 of the Structures Act and 
section 3 of the North West Municipal Structures Act156 extend privilege to municipal 
councillors performing their functions outside of the council. Secondly, that the North 
west provincial legislature’s Privileges Act should be interpreted to provide privilege and 
immunity to those who are not members of a provincial legislature but appear before it 
to testify. These arguments were rejected by the High Court which held that section 28 
is not applicable to proceedings before provincial committees. Mr Dikoko took the 
matter to the Constitutional Court. In the Constitutional Court, Mr Dikoko argued that 
even if the standing committee was that of the provincial legislature and not the council, 
his attendance was, nevertheless, part of the extended business of the council and 
therefore section 28 ought to apply to his conduct.157 
 
The Constitutional Court opined that the purpose of privilege in a constitutional 
democracy is to promote freedom of speech and expression, and full and effective 
deliberation.158 The Court stated that, "there is therefore much to be said for the 
conclusion that if a councillor participates in the genuine and legitimate functions or 
business of the council, whether inside or outside council, the privilege afforded under 
                                            
154 Baatjies R Local government Bulletin 2007 Vol 9 No 1. 
155 Baatjies R (2007) 634. 
156 Act 3 of 2000. 
157 Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC) para 22. 
158 Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC) para 30. 
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the section 28 ought to extend to him or her”.159 The Court found that the statements 
made by Mr Dikoko only concerned his personal finances and indebtedness to the 
council. These statements concerning his overdue cell phone account could not in any 
way be viewed as constituting the real and legitimate business of the council.160 The 
Court ultimately decided that Mr Dikoko’s statements before the standing committee do 
not enjoy immunity under section 161 of the Constitution and section 28 or section 3 of 
the North West Structures Act. 
 
Of importance to note in this case is the possible application of section 28 to conduct of 
councillors outside the council. This, however, would happen in very limited and 
exceptional circumstances. Clearly, the conduct must constitute the real and legitimate 
business of the council. However, this conduct can only enjoy immunity if it pertains to 
the real and legitimate business of the council. The question is then what constitutes 
real and legitimate business of the council.  
 
An insight into what constitutes the real and legitimate business of the council can be 
found in the case of ANC Umvoti Council Caucus and others v Umvoti Municipality.161 
During a council meeting of the Umvoti Municipality, ANC councillors requested time to 
caucus and the Speaker called a lunch recess to allow them to do so. Later, the 
Speaker summoned all the councillors to the council chambers. During this meeting, the 
proceedings became chaotic and the Speaker unsuccessfully attempted to call the 
meeting into order. The mayor left the council chamber, saying that he was unwell, and 
the Speaker, without adjourning the proceedings, followed him to see if he needed help.  
In the absence of the speaker and without an acting Speaker being elected, the council 
took certain resolutions. The mayor was removed from his position and a new mayor 
                                            
159 Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC) para 40. 
160 Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC) para 40. 
161 ANC Umvoti Council Caucus and others v Umvoti Municipality 2010 (3) SA 31 (KZP). The Kwazulu-
Natal High Court acted as both the court of instance and court of appeal. 
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was appointed.162 Based on these facts the municipality approached the court for an 
order declaring the resolutions of the council invalid.  
 
The municipality contended that these resolutions were not taken by the council 
because, at the time they were taken, the council was not properly constituted. The 
court a quo ruled in favour of the municipality and held that the resolutions were not 
valid because the meeting was not properly constituted. The court ordered the 
municipality to pay costs of the application but stated that any person opposing the 
application would have to pay for the costs occasioned by such opposition. The ANC 
Umvoti council caucus decided to appeal this finding before a full bench of the High 
Court and were granted leave to appeal.   
 
At the appeal, it was argued on behalf of the appellants that the councillors were not 
liable to pay costs by reason of the provisions of section 28(1)(b)(i) of the Structures 
Act.  On this argument, the Court reasoned that the councillors were indeed not liable to 
civil proceedings within the meaning of those words in section 28(1) in light of the 
Swartbooi case.163 The second question to be determined was whether the councillors 
in question were participating in deliberations of the full council in the cause of 
legitimate business of that council. If so, based on the reasoning in Swartbooi, the 
appeal against the cost order must succeed since the councillors would be protected by 
the provisions of section 28. On this question, the Court held that because of the fact 
that the council was not properly constituted when the resolutions were taken by the 
councillors, it could not be argued by the appellants that the resolutions complained of 
were part of the legitimate business of the municipality because the gathering at which 
the resolutions were adopted was not the council.164 The Court went onto say that the 
matter at hand is distinguishable from that dealt with in the Swartbooi case where the 
resolutions were taken at a properly constituted council meeting.  In the present matter, 
the resolutions were not part of the legitimate business of the council of the municipality. 
                                            
162 See a summary of the case in the Local Government Bulletin Vol 12(2) (2010) 25.  
163 ANC Umvoti Council Caucus and others v Umvoti Municipality 2010 (3) SA 31 (KZP) para 36. 
164 ANC Umvoti Council Caucus and others v Umvoti Municipality 2010 (3) SA 31 (KZP) para 39.  
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The Court, thus, decided that the conduct of members of the Umvoti Council caucus or 
the appellant councillors was not protected by the provisions of section 28. 
 
The manner in which the Court, in the above case, dealt with the applicability of section 
28 to certain acts by councillors should be commended. From this case, it can be 
argued that the applicability of section 28 to particular conduct would depend on the 
circumstances of each scenario. Councillors cannot rely on the provisions of section 28 
if they are not participating in the affairs of a full council in the cause of legitimate 
business of the council. Consequently, if councillors are not following legally prescribed 
rules (such as basic requirement of reaching a quorum for adopting resolutions) in 
conducting their council meetings, they cannot be regarded as engaging in the 
legitimate business of the council. Further, ignorance of the law is not an excuse as they 
will be liable in court for costs of proceedings should they choose to defend their illegal 
actions.  
 
It is submitted that even if the council meeting in ANC Umvoti Council Caucus and 
others v Umvoti Municipality reached the requisite quorum and the councillors 
proceeded to adopt an unlawful resolution, despite sound advice to the contrary, those 
councillors would not be protected by the provisions of section 28 of the Structures Act, 
as their conduct was deliberate and wilful. Liability will then be an inevitable 
consequence of such conduct by the councillors. Therefore, even if the council had 
reached the requisite quorum, they should incur individual liability if they adopt unlawful 
resolutions with full knowledge of the unlawfulness of their actions.   
 
3.5.1.2. Privilege and immunity and unlawful decisions  
There are arguments that councillors should be individually subjected to legal inquiry for 
adopting unlawful resolutions. Now that it has established that privilege and immunity 
inter alia, applies to actions performed before the council relating to and relevant the 
council and in the course of legitimate business of the council. The issue is now whether 
the protection envisaged in section 28 should apply to conduct that is unlawful and later 
set aside by the courts. The respondents in the Swartbooi case raised this argument 
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because the High Court had found that the resolution by the council to suspend the two 
councillors was unlawful as the council did not have the powers to suspend a 
councillor.This argument was rejected. The Court reasoned that this argument would 
limit the application of section 28 to lawful acts only.According to the court it would not 
matter whether the member of the council knew that the resolution that is being 
supported is inconsistent with the Constitution or law. Consequently, if the provisions of 
section 28 apply to lawful acts only, a member of the municipal council would be liable 
even if he or she had no knowledge of the unconstitutionality or legality of the 
resolution.165 The Court went on to say that if the section were to protect only lawful 
resolutions of the council, such interpretation would be too limited to fulfil the purpose of 
the protection, which is to encourage open and rigorous debate in the council.166 This 
study contends that the protection envisaged in section 28 would not extend to unlawful 
acts where the councillors had knowledge of the unlawfulness and were advised but 
ignored such advice. This argument is in line with the finding of the Court in Willem 
Heyneke v Umhlathuze Municipality which was discussed in chapter 2. Clearly, a 
situation where councillors have knowledge of the unlawfulness of their conduct but 
proceed to adopt the unlawful resolutions would evidence bad faith in the said conduct. 
Bad faith as explained in chapter 2 results in individual liability and it is doubtful whether 
the protection envisaged in section 28 would extend to cases where is there is presence 
of bad faith. 
 
In this regard the judgement in Kitshoff v Speaker of the West Coast District 
Municipality167 is instructive. This case supports the argument advanced in this study, 
namely, that the protection envisaged in section 28 does not extend to unlawful 
resolutions adopted by councillors despite advice to the contrary. This case dealt with 
individual councillors’ personal liability for voting in support of wrongful decisions.168 In 
                                            
165 Swartbooi v Brink and Another (2) 2003 (5) BCLR 502 (CC) para 20. 
166 Swartbooi v Brink and Another (2) 2003 (5) BCLR 502 (CC) para 20. 
167 Kitshoff v Speaker of the West Coast District Municipality Case no. 7136/2008 Western Cape High 
Court, unreported.  
168 Steytler N and De Visser J (2009) 3-17. 
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this case, the issue related to the composition of the council of the West Coast District 
Municipality. Floor-crossing resulted in changes in the council of Saldanha Bay Local 
municipality, one of the local municipalities in the district. As a result the composition of 
the district council and its political structures were also set to change. The Speaker of 
the district council was required by law to convene a meeting at which the district 
council was to re-compose its political structures. The Speaker refused to do so and 
had to be compelled by the High Court to convene the meeting as required by the 
Municipal Structures Act. The court ordered the speaker to personally pay for the costs 
of the application.169  When the meeting eventually took place, as per court order, there 
was a dispute as to who were legitimate representatives of Saldanha Bay Municipality. 
At the meeting, the Speaker of the district council made a ruling regarding the 
composition of the delegation from Saldanha Bay Municipality which is illegal. In 
addition to the illegality of the resolution, it was contrary to the provisions of the 
Municipal Structures Act. Further the resolution was supported by the majority of the 
councillors present at the meeting. This ruling was based on political expedience and 
contrary to the provisions of the Structures Act. Nevertheless, the meeting continued 
accordingly. Once in Court, the Speaker and those councillors who supported him 
conceded that they had been wrong and agreed to pay the costs of the court case. The 
dispute eventually turned on whether they had to pay the full costs. The Court ruled that 
it saw no reason why the councillors, who were frustrated by the illegal ruling, had to 
bear the costs themselves.  
 
In this case, none of the councillors, who participated and supported the unlawful 
decision, raised their privilege and immunity in terms section 28 as a defence. As a 
result, the court did not deal with that argument. However, Steytler and De Visser 
submit that in this case the offence was deliberate and wilful and taken against advice 
to the contrary and as such the incumbent councillors were rightfully sanctioned.170  
They further submit that in the Kitshoff scenario, the councillors’ vote for the unlawful act 
bears no relevance to freedom of expression or debate, which was clearly the case in 
                                            
169 See Steytler N and De Visser J (2009) 3-17, for the discussion of this case.  
170 Steytler N and De Visser J (2009) 3-18. 
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the Swartbooi scenario. Finally, Steylter and De Visser submit that even if the 
councillors would have raised the defence of immunity, it should not have protected 
them from individual liability for supporting the Speakers’ strategy to prevent the council 
from following the law in conducting the council meeting.171 
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that if decisions at council level are taken in total 
disregard of the law and against advice to the contrary being offered to councillors, 
councillors should not hide behind the veil of privilege and immunity offered in section 
28 of the Municipal Structures Act.  It is submitted that this is the correct approach of 
dealing with unlawful resolutions adopted by councillors. In support of the above 
argument by Steytler & De Visser, the study suggests that act of imputing liability to 
councillors for unlawful resolutions involves two elements of analysis. In terms of the 
first element, there must be resolution adopted and it must have been unlawful. The 
unlawfulness of the resolution is not enough to warrant liability. There must be 
knowledge on the part of the incumbent councillor that the action being taken is 
unlawful. If these elements are present at the time that the resolution is taken, then the 
argument of liability should prevail and councillors should not be allowed to enjoy from 
the protection offered by section 28 of the Municipal Structures Act. 
 
3.6. Explaining unlawful council decisions 
The proper functioning of the municipal council and the sound decision-making of a 
municipality should be a concern and a matter of interest to all members of the 
municipal council irrespective of their political party allegiance. It was contended in 
chapter 2 that the partisan behaviour of councillors is one of the reasons why decision-
making process in municipal councils is often poor.  According to De Visser et al, the 
very strict culture of party discipline negatively affects the functioning of the 
municipality.172 The Overview Report on the State of Local Government indicates that 
party political factionalism and polarisation of interests have contributed to the 
                                            
171 Steytler N and De Visser J (2009) 3-18. 
172 De Visser Steytler & May (2009) 34. 
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progressive deterioration of municipal functionality.173 It is contended that this partisan 
behaviour weakens and sometimes undermines the decision-making process in local 
government.  
 
In most of the cases discussed throughout this study, particularly in the cases of Willem 
Heyneke v Umhlathuze Municipalityand ANC Umvoti Council Caucus and others v 
Umvoti Municipality, there is evidence that proper decision-making was hindered by 
politics of factionalism and the strict culture of party discipline. In the Willem Heyneke 
case, members of a certain political organisation voted in unison supporting an illegal 
act. They voted in that manner despite advice to the contrary. Similarly, in the ANC 
Umvoti Council Caucus case, party discipline and polarisation of interests have 
contributed to the failure of the council to properly decide a burning issue at hand. 
 
The partisan behaviour of councillors was at the heart of the matter in Vuyo Mlokoti v 
Amathole District municipality.174 On 19 March 2008, the Amathole District Municipality 
advertised the post of Municipal Manager in the local press. The advertisement 
attracted more than twenty applicants, including Mr. Vuyo Mlokoti ("Mlokoti") and Mr. 
Mlamli Zenzile ("Zenzile"). A short-listing process was undertaken from which it became 
apparent that Mlokoti and Zenzile were the two most outstanding candidates. 
Thereafter, an assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two 
candidates was undertaken by an interviewing panel. The interviewing panel 
recommended Mlokoti as the best suitable candidate for the position. The interviewing 
panel, upon consideration of the Recruitment Policy and other factors, came to the 
decision that Mlokoti outweighed Zenzile on almost every criteria used by the panel and 
Mlokoti had vast experience in the field of local government as he also served as a 
Municipal Manager of the Municipality for two years before serving in the Municipal 
Demarcation Board.  The recommendations of the interviewing panel were based on the 
municipality’s Recruitment Policy in terms of which the best suitable and qualified 
candidate must be appointed for the position in question.   
                                            
173 Cooparative Governance and Traditional Affairs (2009) 10. 
174 Vuyo Mlokoti v Amathole District municipality (2009) 30 ILJ 517 (E).  
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The ANC caucus in the municipality held a special meeting with the regional executive 
committee ("REC") of the ANC and the REC instructed the caucus to vote for Zenzile 
despite latter not being better qualified than Mlokoti. The caucus was also advised by 
the mayor not to proceed with the appointment of Zenzile because he is not the best 
candidate in the scenario. The mayor sort two legal opinions in this regard and 
presented them to the caucus. Notwithstanding these opinions, the caucus still decided 
to proceed with Zenzile. The caucus further took a decision that the two opinions should 
not be produced before the council meeting because they went against their preferred 
candidate.   
 
The council of the Amathole District Municipality resolved to appoint Zenzile to the 
position and, on 23 June 2008, it informed Mlokoti that his application had been 
unsuccessful. In the council meeting, the council did not conduct a vote on these names 
but merely recorded its majority party’s nomination being Zenzile. After being informed 
by the council that his application has been unsuccessful, Mlokoti applied to the Court 
for an order reviewing and setting aside the decision of the Municipality and substituting 
it with an order that he be appointed as municipal manager of the municipality.   
The Court held that the conduct of the council in not conducting a vote on the issue was 
procedurally flawed and contrary to the provisions of the Structures Act.  Furthermore, 
voting in council was necessary especially when there was opposing views.  According 
to the Court, failure to conduct a vote resulted in nullity of the resolution.175Furthermore, 
the Court, in terms of municipality’s Recruitment Policy, read with the provisions of 
section 195 of the Constitution and section 67 of the Local Government: Municipal 
Systems Act, stated that a fair and efficient selection process must be followed in order 
to ensure that all candidates are selected "objectively and on merit." The Court went on 
to say that the municipality correctly pointed that in the absence of any objectively 
justifiable basis to reject the best candidate, the municipality was obliged to appoint him. 
Mlokoti was, without doubt, the best candidate. There was no objectively justifiable 
                                            
175 Vuyo Mlokoti v Amathole District municipality (2009) 30 ILJ 517 (E) para 30. 
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basis on which Mlokoti could be rejected in favour of Zenzile. He was and is therefore 
entitled to be appointed.176 
In this particular case, members of the ANC caucus were not held to account for the 
financial damage that has been caused to the municipality by the decision to appoint a 
candidate contrary to the recruitment policy of the municipality and other legislation. It is 
difficult to imagine why immunity contemplated in section 28 should extend to acts of 
councillors such as the ones in the Mlokoti case above. It is clear from the Mlokoti case 
that the councillors belonging to the caucus were advised as to the legality of their 
resolution and they decided to act against such advice, following the strict culture of 
party discipline at all cost. This case then leads us to support the argument advanced 
by Steytler and De Visser, who suggest that councillors who take decisions intotal 
disregard of the law and against advice to the contrary, should not hide behind the veil 
of immunity contained in section 28.Section 28 was created to promote debate and 
democracy in the council of the municipality, not to be used as a shield protecting 
councillors from deliberately adopting unlawful resolutions. 
 
3.7. Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, the importance and the rational basis for affording privileges and 
immunities to councillors was discussed and it became apparent from the discussion 
that privilege and immunity in municipal councils is an essential tool to ensure 
achievement of democracy in local government.  That being the case, section 28 was 
ideally introduced to protect councillors from potential individual liability that may arise 
when they exercise or perform their functions. It goes without saying that freedom of 
speech is central to protection afforded to councillors in section 28. However the 
judgements that were passed after the Swartbooi case correctly indicate that the 
immunity contemplated in section 28 is not without limits. Certain conducts are not 
worthy of protection or immunity such as the total disregard of the law in council 
meetings. From the discussion of the case law, it became apparent that voting in council 
meetings should be guided and legally justifiable.  
                                            
176 Vuyo Mlokoti v Amathole District municipality (2009) 30 ILJ 517 (E) para 34. 
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In addition to determining the scope of application of section 28, the study attempted to 
investigate the real reason behind the failure by councillors to abide by rules of proper 
decision-making in local government. In so doing, the study suggested that partisan 
behaviour of councillors could be one of the main reasons for such deterioration in the 
decision-making. The study further argued that this partisan behaviour leads to abuse of 
power and in most situations, decisions that are influenced by party discipline eventually 
end up before our courts. Municipalities suffer financially in defending these deliberately 
unlawfully adopted resolutions. It is therefore suggested that liability of councillors for 
the costs of legal proceedings is another alternative form of liability in the event of legal 
proceedings regarding unlawfully adopted resolution.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study is inspired by the deplorable state that the local government sphere finds 
itself, particularly, in relation to the poor decision-making capacity of councillors.Abuse 
of decision-making power necessitated the need to strengthen legislative framework on 
voting and adopting resolutions in local government. The move towards strengthening 
the legislative framework is manifested by the introduction of the Systems Amendment 
Act. This legislative move without doubt suggests that local government is indeed facing 
serious challenges in the decision-making process. This study argues that individual 
liability of councillors is one of the solutions to the challenge of abuse of decision-
making power in local government. 
 
This study has assessed how the current legal framework for local government enables 
or constrains the competence of the municipal council and its committees to exercise 
their decision-making powers in the course of providing leadership to their local 
communities. The study also demonstrated how such decision making power is abused 
by councillors and how this abuse weakens proper functioning and, ultimately, results in 
dysfunctional local government. The study then proceeded to discuss individual liability 
of councillor in light of the provisions of section 176 of the MFMA. The aim of such an 
examination was to determine the scope of application of section 176 to individual 
councillors. The study established that this section creates statutory liability for 
individual councillors and other functionaries mentioned in the section. We further 
established that liability created by section 176 is not liability for costs of the legal 
proceedings. It is liability for the loss or damage suffered by the municipality resulting 
from the conduct of a councillor or another functionary. It is, however, indicated that 
individual liability provided for in this section would not apply to every situation where 
unlawfulness and bad faith exists. Individual liability in terms of section 176 would only 
apply if the councillor in question was performing a function in terms of the MFMA. Thus 
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if a councillor was not performing an act in terms of the MFMA, the provisions of section 
176 would not find application to his/her conduct. 
  
In addition to an investigation of section 176 of the MFMA, I discussed the legislative 
developments brought about by the Systems Amendment Act, particularly focusing on 
provisions relating to abuse of power. The developments introduced by the Systems 
Amendment Act are a progressive legislative move towards ensuring proper exercise of 
the decision-making power that is vested in the council. These developments provide an 
alternative legislative solution to the liability established in terms of section 176 of the 
MFMA. The study highlighted that the enforcement of the provisions of section 14 of the 
Act and item 14 of the Code depends solely on the municipal council itself. It is the 
council that must be bold enough to enforce the Code in case of a breach of section 14 
of the Act. The study postulates that proper enforcement of item 14 of the Code, 
particularly with reference to abuse of voting power, would surely reduce the number of 
court cases regarding unlawful resolutions adopted by the council. It will further reduce 
abuse of power in local government. 
 
The study explored the limits of immunity afforded to councillors in terms of section 28 
of the Municipal Structures Act, with view of demonstrating that such immunity is not 
absolute and does apply to every situation. The study commenced this exercise by 
discussing the rational basis for affording privileges and immunities to councillors. From 
such discussion, the study concluded that privilege and immunity in municipal councils 
is an essential tool to ensure the advancement and achievement of democracy in local 
government. That being the case, section 28 was ideally introduced to protect 
councillors from potential individual liability that may arise when they exercise or 
perform their functions. The Constitutional Court in Swartbooi laid a foundation on how 
courts should interpret the provisions of section 28 regarding immunity of councillors. 
Judgements that were passed after the Swartbooi case cautioned against blanket 
application of section 28 to all unlawful conduct of councillors. Judgements such 
Kitshoff, Dikoko v Mokhatla and ANC Umvoti Council Caucus and others v Umvoti 
Municipality, lead me to conclude that the immunity contemplated in section 28 is not 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
without limits. From these cases, it is clear that certain conducts do not qualify for 
protection or immunity, such as the total disregard of the law in council meetings. From 
the discussion of the case law, it became apparent that voting in council meetings 
should be guided and legally justifiable. During the course of such exploration, we 
identified another form of liability of councillors, namely liability for the costs of legal 
proceedings. This form of liability, the study contended, arises in the event that an 
unlawfully adopted resolution is challenged in court and same is set aside by the court.   
 
In addition to determining the scope of application of section 28, the study attempted to 
investigate one of reasons behind the failure by councillors to abide by rules of proper 
decision-making in local government. In so doing, the study suggested that partisan 
behaviour of councillors could be one of the main reasons for bad decision-making. The 
study further argued that this partisan behaviour leads to abuse of power in that 
councillors would do anything to advance the demands or interests of their political 
party, even if it means adopting unlawful resolutions. As was seen in the case of Vuyo 
Mlokoti v Amathole District Municipality and to some extent in ANC Umvoti Council 
Caucus and others v Umvoti Municipality, decisions that are influenced by party 
discipline are eventually reviewed and set aside by our courts.  
 
It is believed that the imputation of individual liability on councillors for abuse of power 
will go a long a way in improving the decision-making process in local government. 
Individual liability will restore public confidence as regards the decision-making of the 
council. It is argued that the threat of individual liability will ensure behavioral patterns, 
such as party discipline, do not adversely affect decision-making in the council. It is 
believed that the threat of individual liability would ensure that even councillors 
influenced by the culture of party discipline do not vote in support of resolutions that are 
in conflict with any legislation applicable to local government. Individual liability will help 
to promote a culture of sound decision-making in local government as well as good 
governance. With the threat of individual liability, it is contended, that councillors will 
endeavour to be diligent in casting their votes and act in good faith in the exercise of 
their functions. 
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